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 The purpose of this thesis was to explore the philosophical and rhetorical elements 
of Origen of Alexandria’s Contra Celsum.  Herein, one can find to their delight three major 
themes of ancient argumentation: the argument from antiquity, the moral effect argument, 
and the argument from prophecy.  The bulk of this thesis is the author’s own exegesis of key 
passages in the Contra Celsum.   
 The major thesis advanced here is that the strategies of rhetoric used by Christian 
and non-Christian in late antiquity were quite similar, in fact, exactly the same in many cases.  
The interpretation of key textual passages in the Contra Celsum advanced here is offered as 
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 The focus of this inquiry is on the philosophy, rhetoric and argumentative structure 
of Origen of Alexandria’s Contra Celsum.  The Contra Celsum was a massive polemical text 
written by Origen to refute the claims made by the Platonist philosopher Celsus in his attack 
on Christianity, a work entitled the a0lhqh\v lo/gov, or True Doctrine.  Origen’s defense of 
Christianity presents a wealth of information about the status of Christian argumentation in 
the third century.  While the primary subject of this thesis is the Contra Celsum, other 
representative texts of the first and second centuries will be used to better understand the 
history of argumentation and the kinds of persuasion used by Christian thinkers.  The thesis 
advanced here is that the strategy of persuasion used by Origen was to present Christian 
belief and practice as normative and superior to Hellenistic culture and religion by appealing 
to a shared ground of common assumptions and beliefs between Greeks and Christians.  
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II.  Scholarship on Origen and Methodological Issues 
 One of the methodological problems of studying Origen is that many of his writings 
are filled with interpolations.  His Peri Archon, for example, was translated from the original 
Greek into Latin by Rufinus of Aquilea, who admitted to toning down many of Origen’s 
more controversial ideas.  Fortunately, the Contra Celsum has survived in its entirety, with few 
of the corruption issues associated with his other writings, and is available in a 13th century 
manuscript and the Philokalia.1  A recent English translation by Henry Chadwick is widely 
used by scholars.  Despite the availability of the text and its importance for 2nd and 3rd 
century Christian studies, there is a dearth of secondary literature on the Contra Celsum.  
There is, however, a sizable amount of secondary literature on Origen’s exegesis of the Bible 
and his mystical theology.  Most of this scholarship is rooted in a Christian theological 
perspective, usually focusing on Origen’s tenuous relationship to Christian orthodoxy.2 
 There has been a resurgence of interest in the thought and legacy of Origen in the 
twentieth century especially.  One of the major preoccupations of recent commentators has 
been the question of determining the extent to which Origen was compromised in his 
Christian authenticity by “outside” influences.  Christianity is usually taken to be one thing, 
self-sufficient and pure, while the “outside” influences—Greek philosophy, culture and 
religion for the most part—are taken to be quite distinct and subordinate.  These 
interpretations often assume that the Christian tradition is hermetically sealed and can only 
                                                          
1 See Chadwick, Contra Celsum. Cambridge: CUP, 1953. pp. xxix-xxxii. 
2 See for example Jean Danielou's Origen. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1955; Henri Crouzel  Origen. 
Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1989.  
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subsume and transform other cultures and ideas when it comes into contact with them.    
Characteristic of this view is Jean Danielou’s assessment of Origen:  
“The genuinely biblical element [of Origen’s exegetical method] mingles with 
a stream flowing from the culture of the time…The core of the problem, 
then, is to unravel the tangled skein and separate the main threads of genuine 
typology from the temporary accretions derived from the culture of the time.”3   
 
The dominant metaphor here is the easily separable skeins of a rope, of which the less 
important strands, once unraveled, will reveal a pure and substantial core.  Danielou’s 
magisterial treatment of Origen was responsible for sparking much contemporary 
scholarship, so this observation concerns only one flaw in an otherwise helpful work.  A 
much more dynamic view of cultural interaction is needed to understand early Christian 
literature.4   
Such a preoccupation with the coherence and purity of systems led scholars like 
Danielou to make such theological claims at the end of his work that, for example, “There 
can thus be little point in asking whether every part of the system is logically coherent.  The 
source of unity lies deeper than that, in Origen’s intimate knowledge and eager love of the 
Lord Jesus.”5  The Origen presented here by Danielou is a masterful philosopher and 
theologian, uncontaminated by the parasitic influence of Platonism and Hellenism.  Danielou 
argued that Origen somehow embodied all of the available categories because his intellectual 
and spiritual vitality was so complex and varied that a single category would only 
oversimplify matters.  Undoubtedly there is some validity in this view, but it cannot be the 
                                                          
3 Danielou, p. 185.    
4 See for example Jonathan Z. Smith’s Drudgery Divine,  The University of Chicago Press, 1990 in which 
the Protestant biases of 19th and 20th century scholarship on early Christianity are revealed as disguised 
anti-Catholic polemics. The obsessions with purity and originality pervade the works that Smith addresses 
here as well and are similar to much of the scholarship on Origen. 
5 Danielou, p. 314. 
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case simply because the alternative—Origen as non-Christian, as a compromised Hellene—
is too horrible to fathom for modern thinkers.  
Other scholars, like Henri Crouzel, saw Origen’s work as a strictly Biblical enterprise.  
He has argued that Origen’s intellectual processes began by “starting from Scripture and also 
using philosophic data and Hellenistic imagery.”6  It is quite unlikely, and probably 
philosophically untenable, that Origen would have been so self-conscious and wooden in his 
intellectual development, as to deliberately utilize “Hellenistic imagery” and “philosophic 
data” to supplement an already fully functional Christianity.  Cultural fusion is a much 
messier process than this view of Origen piecing together ideas as if they were distinct areas.  
A slightly more complex view of Origen’s interaction with Hellenistic culture that 
takes us in more useful directions can be found in the work of Joseph Trigg, who has 
observed that Origen “does not always seem to have been aware…of the extent to which 
Platonism molded his understanding of the Christian life.”7  This seems to indicate that 
creating Christian language is a complex affair, informed by sometimes subconscious 
influences.  The preoccupation with reconciling the supposed opposition between 
philosophy and theology in Origen’s oeuvre is still present, even in Trigg’s work.8   
Even very recent commentators have devoted much energy to constructing an 
“orthodox” Origen by analyzing his relationship to philosophy, which usually turns out to 
mean that philosophy did not overtake Origen’s Christianity.  Mark Edwards has been one 
particularly astute analyst of Origen’s relation to Platonism.  He has argued in reference to 
Origen’s interactions with Hellenistic philosophy that even “If Origen learned the use of 
                                                          
6 Crouzel, H. (1989). Origen. Edinburgh, T & T Clark.  
7 Trigg (1983), p. 74. 
8 See Trigg’s “Origen Man of the Church” in Origenian Quinta. Ed. by Robert Daly.  Leuven University 
Press: Leuven, 1992.  Pp. 51-56 
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allegory from the Platonists, the premises and eductions were his own.”9  This may very well 
be the case—the point here is not to quarry with the exact relationship between Platonic 
philosophy and Christianity in Origen’s writings—but rather with the single-minded 
preoccupation with rescuing Origen from the clutches of his enemies.  Edwards seems to 
assume that a case needs to be made for Origen’s intellectual autonomy from philosophy.  
Furthermore, the assumption still is retained in Edward’s work that a distinction between 
Platonism as such and a fiercely independent (read: Christian) Origen needs to be made. The 
tone of Edwards’ work and his predecessors often presupposes that “true” Christianity 
retains a pure, solidified essence, and derivations from this essence become derivations 
because they have been compromised by some parasitic influence.  So, much of the 
secondary literature has been concerned with Origen’s relationship to some normative 
category of Christian orthodoxy.  This will not be the focus of this thesis.   
Instead of these disputes within Christianity, the focus here will be on the 
argumentative rhetoric in the Contra Celsum.  By “rhetoric” I mean simply a “technique of 
persuasive discourse,”10 which can permeate a text in explicit and implicit ways.  I will not 
use it as a pejorative category, as it is often taken to mean in modern usage.  Often the 
pejorative sense of “rhetoric” is a skeptical reading of a speaker’s words, for example, in the 
sense of a speech that contains much verbal artistry without any real underlying substance.  
                                                          
9 Mark Edwards.  “Christ or Plato?” in Christian Origins: Theology, Rhetoric and Community. Ed. by Lewis 
Ayers and Gareth Jones.  Routledge: London, 1998. pp. 11-25. Edward’s view of the distinction between 
Platonic and Christian allegorical methods in Origen is that in the latter case, participation in God is 
through “historical epiphanies” and in the former through analogical progression.  Origen certainly 
believed in the historicity of the central elements in the Christian narrative (i.e. cross, resurrection, etc.) 
but this distinction seems to be drawn primarily to distance Origen from Valentinian or more generally 
Gnostic usage of the allegorical method, which are often taken to be imaginative repudiations of historical 
truths. 
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Instead, “rhetoric” should be taken to signify all the vast discursive techniques by which a 
writer is attempting to convince his audience of a particular point.  There were, of course, 
rhetorical schools that produced handbooks of rhetoric, all of which had great influence on 
the style of Hellenistic literature—but the focus of this thesis will not be on the influence of 
particular rhetoricians on Origen.  Rather, the focus will be on the general strategies of 
rhetorical argumentation employed by Origen to convince and persuade readers of his 
understanding of the Christian tradition.  A survey of some thinkers who were writing prior 
to Origen will help give us some insight into the history of particular arguments used in the 
Contra Celsum.  We will begin by briefly looking at the Jewish historian Josephus because his 
arguments concerning the antiquity of Judaism were very useful to Christian apologists.  
Then, a quick examination of Justin Martyr and Tatian will bring us up to the time of 
Origen’s Contra Celsum. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
10 This definition is taken from Paul Ricoeur’s “Rhetoric—Poetics—Hermeneutics” in Rhetoric and 




III.  Writers Before Origen 
i.  Josephus 
 Many themes in Christian apologetic literature of the second and third centuries can 
be traced back to the Jewish historian Josephus (37 ca-100 CE).  Josephus had found it 
necessary to defend Judaism from the accusations leveled against it by the Greeks.  The 
result of these polemical efforts was the Contra Apionem.  Written after the Jewish Antiquities in 
93/94 CE, the Contra Apionem was an attempt to establish the great antiquity 
(a0rxaiologi9an) of Judaism as a response to the anti-Judaism of Greco-Roman polemicists.  
The relevance of the Contra Apionem to Origen’s work is in the argument from antiquity that 
Josephus employed, which Origen would later put to good use. 11  Simply put, the argument 
from antiquity was an argument about which civilization was oldest.  The prevailing view in 
this period was that truth originated with the oldest human tradition.  Thus, if Judaism could 
be established as the oldest tradition, then later traditions owed their participation in truth to 
Judaism.  If his opponents argued that Judaism had borrowed ideas and practices from other 
cultures—like the Greeks—Josephus could turn around and say that since Judaism was older 
than these cultures, that the accusation was groundless.12   
                                                          
11 For a discussion of this phenomenon in relation to Origen, see Feldman, L. H. (1990). "Origen's Contra 
Celsum and Josephus' Contra Apionem: The Issue of Jewish Origins." Vigiliae Christianae 44: 101-135.  
12 Chadwick saw clearly enough that the proof from antiquity was absurd.  Despite this negative appraisal, 
he cautioned that “from a strictly historical viewpoint our superior smile is a grossly unimaginative 
anachronism.” From his Early Christian Though and the Classical Tradition.  Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984. p. 
14.  It is hard to see how we would transcend our own contingency in evaluating the legitimacy of ancient 
assumptions.  Certainly we begin with our own ethnocentric judgments because none of us start from 
neutral standpoints, but are we being “anachronistic” when we make judgments about the past?  It seems 
to be the case that only if we replace ancient beliefs with our own and then make historical evaluations 
based on this transferal are we then guilty of “grossly unimaginative anachronism.”   
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 Josephus wrote the Contra Apionem in order to respond to the “malicious calumnies 
of certain individuals”13  These individuals had argued that Judaism was much younger than 
Greek and Egyptian culture, and thus inferior.  The key passage for our purposes comes in 
Book II of the Contra Apionem: “Each nation endeavors to trace its own institutions back to 
the remotest date [to\ a0rxaio/taton], in order to create the impression that, far from 
imitating [mimeisqai] others, it has been the one to set its neighbors an example of orderly 
life under law.”14  Josephus is basically saying “See, everybody else is making this 
argument—so, the Jews get a shot at it too.”  The influence of such ideas on Origen would 
be profound: he believed that Christianity was true in part because it could trace its origin 
through Judaism.  However, if Judaism was not itself an ancient and well-established 
religion, then Christianity, by extension, would be discredited.  
 To prove the antiquity of Judaism, Josephus used a variety of historical sources, both 
Jewish and non-Jewish.  One Egyptian historian by the name of Manetho was particularly 
useful.  Josephus claimed that Manetho’s history “furnished us [i.e. Josephus and the reader] 
with evidence from Egyptian literature on two most important points: first that we came 
into Egypt from elsewhere, and secondly, that we left it at a date so remote in the past that it 
preceded the Trojan War by nearly a thousand years.”15  Josephus uses an Egyptian historian 
to prove the antiquity of Judaism, but he simultaneously argues that the Jews were not 
Egyptian.  The Jews had to be unique; to say that they were originally of Egyptian 
provenance would be the same as saying that Egyptian culture had created them.  
                                                          
13 Josephus.  Contra Apionem. 1.1 in Loeb Classical Library: Josephus vol. 1. Ed. H. St. J. Thackeray. New 
York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1926  
14 Contra Apionem. 2, 152. 
15 Contra Apionem. 1,104. 
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After arguing for the antiquity of Judaism, Josephus claimed that later outsider 
cultures simply borrowed their ideas from the Jews.  Thus, derivative inklings of Jewish 
theology can be found in Pythagoras, Anaxagoras, Plato and the Stoic philosophers, all of 
whom had borrowed heavily from Moses.16  These other cultures who had borrowed from 
Judaism were too elitist; they had crudely “addressed their philosophy to the few.”17  
Josephus contrasts this with the universalism and integrated vision of the Jewish lawgiver, 
Moses, who “implanted this belief [i.e. the unification of belief with practice] concerning 
God… to all future generations.”18  So, Judaism was the oldest tradition—as established by 
Manetho and others—and later cultures borrowed ideas from Judaism. 
This view of Moses as a global legislator who created lasting norms for all cultures 
had a richer and more exaggerated history in earlier Jewish historians.  For example, 
Artapanus viewed Moses as the inventor of Greek and Egyptian religion (an odd claim to be 
sure), as well as singing and poetry, astrology, the science of hermeneutics, and Egyptian 
hieroglyphs.19  The wide observance of a day of rest and dietary restrictions, for example, are 
also given as proofs of Jewish influence on Greeks and Barbarians alike.20  Despite the Jews’ 
isolation from their co-religionists, Josephus maintained that their beliefs and practices were 
in part the global paradigms for all cultures.  Of course, these paradigms were corrupted by 
malice and ignorance on the part of the non-Jewish “borrower,” but they still served as the 
eternal moral exemplars for the world.   
                                                          
16 Contra Apionem  2.168 
17 Contra Apionem 2.169 
18 Contra Apionem 2.169-170 
19 See Droge, pp. 26-27.  Many of the techniques and themes of Jewish polemics in this period were taken 
from Egyptian sources like Hecataeus of Abdera.  Hecataeus had claimed an Egyptian origin for Greek 
philosophy in that the Greek philosophers came as ‘tourists’ to Egypt to gather wisdom. 
20 Contra Apionem 2.282.  ‘Barbarian’ (ba/rbaroj) was Josephus’, and any Greek’s term for a non-Greek 
because their language sounded like “bar-bar” to the untrained ethnocentric ear of the Greek thinker. 
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  Christian apologists found Josephus’ arguments about the antiquity of Judaism very 
useful for their apologetic enterprises.  Just as Josephus had appropriated Egyptian 
historiographical polemics, the Christians would, in turn, use the Jewish arguments for their 
own purposes.  There is nothing unusual or ironic about the fact that Jews and Christians 
alike adapted the same historical material for their own quite specific purposes.  Texts have a 
way of ending up in a variety of people’s hands who then decide to put them to use in their 
own idiosyncratic ways.  Now, let us look briefly at Justin Martyr and Tatian as precursors to 
Origen. 
 
ii. Justin Martyr 
 
Justin Martyr (100-165 CE) was one of the first Christians to respond to the growing 
attack on Christian belief and practice during the second century.  He was born in Flavia 
Neapolis in Samaria21 and converted to Christianity ca. 130 CE.  While traveling in Ephesus 
he studied the philosophy of the Pythagoreans, the Stoics, the Peripatetics, and finally the 
Platonists, which he took up whole-heartedly.  He remained convinced of the full truth of 
Platonism until, by his own account, he encountered an old man on a beach who convinced 
him that Platonism was an inadequate source of truth because it lacked the revelation found 
in the Bible.22  The revelation of the prophets in the Old Testament concerning Christ 
convinced Justin to blend this new “philosophy” of Christianity with his already established 
knowledge of the Stoic’s logos theology and Platonism.   
                                                          
21 1 Apology 1 St. Justin Martyr: The First and Second Apologies.  Trans. by Leslie William Barnard.  New 
York: Paulist Press, 1997.  For a concise and excellent overview of Justin’s life and apologetic strategy, see 
Chadwick, H. (1993). Justin Martyr's Defence of Christianity. The Early Church and Greco-Roman 
Thought. E. Ferguson. New York, Garland Publishing, Inc. 8: 23-45.  
22 Dialogue with Trypho 3-10  
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The revelation that the Christians believed was in the Old Testament was recounted 
to Justin by this mysterious old man, who claimed that “long before the time of those 
reputed philosophers, there lived blessed men who were just and loved by God, men who 
spoke through the inspiration of the Holy Spirit…”23  Justin’s identity as a Christian was in 
part strongly shaped by Hellenistic philosophy, but his conversion was confirmed by the 
prophecies he found in the writings of the Jews.  The Christian use of Old Testament 
prophecies was a vitally important component of Christian argumentation in the early 
Church.  Its most explicit formulation was already embedded in the New Testament 
Gospels.  The liberal sprinkling of references to Psalms and Isaiah was widely used as a 
technique of persuasion for potential proselytes.  Justin claimed to be mightily impressed by 
this proof, but it certainly helped that in Christianity, he thought he had found confirmation 
of his Platonic convictions.  In fact, of all of the Greek apologists of the pre-Constantinian 
era, Justin was probably the most optimistic about the compatibility of Hellenistic 
philosophy with Christianity.24 
Many of the themes developed by Justin would be utilized and expanded by Origen, 
so it is worthwhile to give a brief overview of Justin’s contribution to Christian apologetic 
literature.  His two Apologies, which were addressed to the Emperor Antoninus Pius25 
around15626, were written to defend Christianity from Roman aspersions and to plea for 
recognition and clemency from the Roman authorities for Christian believers.  
                                                          
23 Dialogue with Trypho 7 
24 See Chadwick (1966), p. 10. 
25 1 Apology 1 
26 See Grant, Robert M. Greek Apologists of the Second Century.  The Westminster Press: Philadelphia, 
1988, pp. 52-53.  The First Apology was probably occasioned by the martyrdom of Polycarp.  Grant 
believed that the two apologies were actually one, and were only separated later. 
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The rhetorical strategy behind Justin’s presentation of Christian belief was to appeal 
to the common ground between the Christians and his opponents.  He realized that a 
fideistic assertion of belief, without analogy or rational argumentation would be completely 
unpersuasive.  To accomplish this, Justin compares Christian stories with those of the 
Greeks in order to suggest that the Christian stories are not really so odd and dangerously 
novel as the Greeks had claimed.  He also attacks the Greek stories for their immorality.  For 
example, to lessen the apparent offence occasioned by the Christian belief that God has a 
son, Justin would simply show how the belief that the gods had children was prevalent in 
Greek mythology.  The Christian belief that God had a son was nothing “new or different” 
when compared with the Greek belief that Jupiter had many sons, who, despite their divine 
parentage, were given to wanton acts of human licentiousness.27  Indeed, Christ’s suffering as 
a divine being is hardly scandalous in light of the indignities suffered by Bacchus, Asclepius 
and Hercules.28  His virgin birth is no novelty when compared with the virgin birth of 
Perseus to Danaë.29  Even the miracles of Jesus should not cause offence if one recalls the 
miraculous healing stories of Asclepius.30 
 In addition to comparing Christian stories to those of the Greeks, Justin made good 
use of the argument from antiquity.  Here is a typical passage demonstrating a strong reliance 
on this argument: 
Whatever things we say as having been learned from Christ, and the prophets who 
came before him, are alone true, and older than all the writers who have lived, and 
we ask to be accepted, not because we say the same things as they do, but because 
we speak the truth; and [secondly] that Jesus Christ alone was really begotten as Son 
of God, being His Word and First-begotten and Power, and becoming man by His 
will He taught us these things for the conversion and restoration of the human race; 
                                                          
27 1 Apology 21 
28 1 Apology 22 
29 1 Apology 22 
30 1 Apology 22 
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and [thirdly] that before He became a man among men some, under the influence of 
the wicked demons already mentioned, related as real occurrences the myths which 
the demons had devised through the poets, in the same manner as they have caused 
to be fabricated the scandalous reports against us and impious deeds, of which there 
is neither witness nor proof—we shall bring forward this proof.31 
 
Justin here seamlessly weaves the proof from prophecy with his understanding of historical 
truth, suggesting that the truth of the prophetic passages, at least in part, is attested to by 
their provenance in a most ancient past.  He did not rest his argument on the Christian 
reading of the Septuagint alone—such an appeal would have seemed too partisan.  Instead, 
he presents the Greek poets as third-party witnesses to Christianity, with the implicit 
suggestion to the non-Christian reader being that these are more objective witnesses to 
Christianity than the Judeo-Christian literature.   
The bulk of Justin’s appeal to non-Christian prophetic sources relied on the so-called 
Sybilline oracles.  Justin’s belief in the Stoic doctrine of the logos gave him reason enough to 
incorporate non-Christian stories.  The logos spermatikos doctrine held that every human is 
born with certain notions implanted in their mind, a kind of seminal reasoning that helps 
direct philosophic and spiritual inquiry.  With this in hand, Justin can argue that “Whatever 
either lawgivers or philosophers uttered well, they elaborated according to their share of 
logos by invention and contemplation.”32  Truth springs from one source—the divine logos.  
Hence, whenever Plato and the Greeks speak anything that is laudable, it is “the property of 
us Christians.”33 
Such a universalistic reading of human knowledge was well suited to the goals of 
Christian argumentation.  It established the idea that what Christians believed in was 
essentially nothing new, but a perennial expression of divine and ancient truth.  Of course, 
                                                          
31 1 Apology 23 
32 2 Apology 10 
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the Crucifixion and Resurrection as central components of the Christian story were in some 
sense new, because they were recent events—but even these were prophesied by ancient 
texts, and the truth they embodied was ordered and planned from the beginning.  The 
Greeks had probably misunderstood Judeo-Christian beliefs, but they nonetheless had 
limited access to some revelatory truths.  All of this was directed towards a complex 
argument that combined Justin’s logos theology with various apologetic techniques, the aim of 
which was to demonstrate that Christianity was no mere novelty. 
 The novelty of Christian belief is a dangerous possibility always lurking in the 
apologetic literature, and Justin attempts to lessen this possibility by claiming that the 
Christian doctrine of creation is quite similar to Plato’s theories about the origin of the 
cosmos, and Christian eschatological belief is simply a reiteration of the Stoic doctrine of a 
cataclysmic conflagration.34  The rhetorical program of forcing a common ground of shared 
mythology and assumptions between Christianity and Hellenistic culture is an attempt to get 
rid of any hint of novelty within Christianity.  The implicit rhetorical question here is “Why 
persecute us since our stories and beliefs have so much in common with yours?”  Justin is no 
Joseph Campbell, blithely combining myths into syncretistic narratives that embody 
perennially occurring psychological truths.  This is the case because, for Justin, even more so 
for Origen, there is no deep affinity between the core revelations of Christianity and 
Hellenistic thought.  The observation of each apparent affinity is actually intended to 
temporarily disarm the skeptical reader, for whom the charge of novelty was a powerful 
indictment of unwarranted Christian belief.  Christian stories are similar to Greek stories 
formally, but unlike the latter, the former are edifying.  If Jupiter is brought up as a point of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
33 2 Apology 13 
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comparison to a Christian story, he will later be eviscerated as a parricide.35  Bacchus and 
other gods are derided for their sexual immorality and contrasted unfavorably with the 
Christian deity:  
“We are not persuaded that He [i.e. Jesus] ever was goaded by lust for 
Antiope, or such other women, or of Ganymede, nor was He delivered by 
that hundred-handed monster whose aid was obtained through Thetis, nor, 
on this account, was anxious that her son Achilles should destroy many of 
the Greeks because of his concubine Briseis.  We pity those who believe 
these things, and we recognize those who invented them to be demons.”36 
 
Justin’s Platonic conception of God as impassible, eternal and uncreated gave him 
ample resources for attacking the anthropomorphism of the Greco-Roman pantheon.  His 
attack on Greek anthropomorphism is not simply a project in deconstruction; he adds to his 
critique what he sees as a substantive charge, namely that Jesus was morally pure, while the 
Greek gods were blatantly immoral.  To wit, he juxtaposes a moral Christ with an immoral 
Jupiter in what emerges as a kind of moral litmus test for “true” deity.  Justin maintains that 
Jesus, unlike the Greek gods, was not sexually impure, and furthermore, Jesus’ miraculous 
birth was certainly not the product of sexual intercourse.37  So, Christian revelation was not a 
complete novelty and it contained much that was morally edifying, unlike the Greek myths. 
Many of the assumptions that Josephus had made in the Contra Apionem surface 
strongly in Justin’s Apology.  Primarily because “Moses is more ancient than all the Greek 
writers” Justin argues that all that is good and true in Greek philosophy owes its origins to 
the prophets and the logos.38  The demons are the worst of thieves since they plagiarized 
                                                                                                                                                                             
34 1 Apology 20 
35 1 Apology 21 
36 1 Apology 25 
37 1 Apology 21   
38 1 Apology 44 
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Isaiah’s prophecy of the virgin birth in the myth of Perseus and applied other Scriptures to 
Hercules and Bacchus.39  
Justin Martyr was defending Christianity against the charges that it was a mere 
novelty.  He did this by showing the similarity between Greek and Christian stories.  
However, in order to show why the Christian stories were preferable, he argued that they 
were morally superior.  The Greek stories, replete as they were with incest and murder at the 
hands of the gods, were self-evidently inferior to the piety of Christian Scriptures.  This was 
a quite traditional line of argumentation and one will not be surprised to find it used quite 
frequently by Origen in his Contra Celsum. 
 
iii.  Tatian 
Justin’s pupil Tatian (120-173) had a less pacific view of the compatibility of 
Hellenistic thought with Christian belief.  Tatian’s writings exhibit a marked disdain for 
Greek religious ideals.  His Oratio ad Graecos (Exhortation to the Greeks) is of a genre similar to 
Justin’s work by the same title, but its approach to Greek culture and philosophy is quite 
different.  The general argument of the Oratio ad Graecos is that Greek religion and culture is 
immoral and inferior to the Christian tradition. 
There is very little reflection of the logos spermatikos in Tatian’s writing.  Instead of 
showing the inklings of truth in other traditions, he harshly derides the Greek philosophers 
for gluttony, arrogance and general immorality.40  His technique is to ask rhetorical questions 
that reveal the absurdity of Greek mythology: “Why should I reverence gods who take bribes 
and are angry if they do not get them?  Let them keep their fate: I have no wish to worship 
                                                          
39 1 Apology 54 
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planets.”41  He attacks Homer’s Iliad on the basis that Helen is absurdly honored by the 
Greeks, even though she was an adulteress.42  Tatian, like Justin before him, uses the moral 
critique of religion to good effect and denies the use of allegory to his opponents. 43  The 
Christian belief in the Incarnation is not “nonsense” when compared with Greek myths, 
which are not only immoral but hopelessly anthropomorphic fantasies.  The Greek audience 
is warned to “not allegorize either your stories or your gods [mhde\ tou\v mu/qov mhde\ tou\s 
qeou\s u\mw~n a0llhgorh/shte ], for if you try to do so your conception of divinity is subverted 
not only by us but also by yourselves.”44  
 The Oratio ad Graecos also uses the argument from antiquity frequently.  To buttress 
this argument, Tatian employs a convoluted chronology intended to show that Christianity, 
through Judaism, had legitimate claim to the most antique culture.  In this vein, Tatian 
argues: “But in regard to my present point, I am most anxious to make it absolutely clear that 
Moses is not only older than Homer but is older even than the writers before him, Linus, 
Philammon, Thamyris, Amphion, Orpheus, Musaeus…”45  Here we can see that Christianity 
can be proven through the antiquity of Moses and Judaism.  By Tatian’s time, it was 
apparently sufficient to state the fact of Judaism’s antiquity, since people like Josephus had 
already done the gritty historiographical work.  With Justin Martyr and Tatian, we can see the 
formulation of a coherent Christian apologetic tradition.  The primary theme of their 
works—the superiority of Christianity vis-à-vis Hellenistic culture—features strongly in 
Origen’s Contra Celsum. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
40 Oratio ad Graecos 2-3 
41 Oratio ad Graecos 10 
42 Oratio ad Graecos 10 
43 For a useful discussion of these issues, see Dawson, D. (1992). Allegorical Readers and Cultural 
Revision in Ancient Alexandria. Berkeley, University of California Press.  
44 Oratio ad Graecos 21.2 
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IV. Origen of Alexandria’s Contra Celsum 
i. Date of Celsus’ True Doctrine and Origen’s Contra Celsum 
Origen (184/5-254/5 CE) probably wrote the Contra Celsum in the last years of his 
life, in or around 248 CE under the reign of Phillip the Arab.46  The pagan philosopher 
Celsus had written his True Doctrine in the last portion of the 170’s, even though there is 
some disagreement on this issue.47  It is entirely unclear what specifically occasioned the 
writing of the True Doctrine, since we only know about it through Origen.  It is also unclear 
whether or not Origen was the first Christian to respond to Celsus, even though he probably 
was the first to explicitly and systematically respond point by point.   
 
ii. What is known about Celsus  
Celsus was a Platonist philosopher who had an impressive and wide-ranging 
knowledge of Christian belief and practice.  This knowledge was apparently no affectation; 
he was apparently able to make a more devastating critique of Christianity than his less-
informed predecessors.  Celsus’ critique was unique in some sense because of the level of 
sophistication of his treatise and the fact that he had read some of the New Testament 
gospels and probably portions of Genesis.  Later Christians thought he was an Epicurean.  
Eusebius, writing in the fourth century, labeled Celsus an “Epicurean,” which was a classic 
                                                                                                                                                                             
45 Oratio ad Graecos 41.1 italics added 
46 See Eusebius EH 6.36.1-3.  
47 See for example Hargis (1999) pp. 20-23 for a discussion of the evidence surrounding this dating.  
There is some meager internal evidence for dating which would point to the Decian persecutions in 178.  
Hargis however, argues for c. 200 as the date primarily because Celsus did not, in his view, capitalize on 
the anti-Christian rhetoric that was more popular in the 170’s.  He posits that the absence of such a 
critique indicates that the specific criticisms had probably faded by that time, having been replaced by 
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term of abuse by both Christian and Greek thinkers alike.48  Undoubtedly much of this was 
intended for rhetorical effect, but there probably was some initial confusion on Origen’s part 
as to the exact philosophical leanings of Celsus early in his response.  Origen began the 
Contra Celsum with the assumption that his opponent was an Epicurean, but it is clear in later 
books that he abandoned that position, realizing the Platonist leanings of Celsus. 
 Very little is known about Celsus outside of interpretations of contexts within the 
Contra Celsum.  Our only access to his True Doctrine is from what Origen himself quotes from 
the Contra Celsum itself.  It is fortunate that Origen quotes his opponent’s words at length, 
but we cannot be sure if it was verbatim.  We know he summarized quite a few passages, but 
there is no compelling reason to think that he systematically misrepresented Celsus’ words.  
Despite these problems, at the very least, we know that Celsus was seen as a “pagan” 
intellectual of Platonic pretensions.49  He is generally thought to be a Platonist, at least in 
part because he quotes Plato throughout his attack on Christianity, and his arguments often 
rely implicitly on a Platonic framework.  Despite this Platonic background, Celsus is 
generally not viewed as a profound philosopher.  For example, Michael Frede has argued 
that “there is no reason to suppose that he [i.e. Celsus] was a philosopher of any 
significance” and that the True Doctrine “must have seemed in many regards rather 
                                                                                                                                                                             
other ones.  This is still an argument from silence, and one could simply argue that Celsus, seeing himself 
as a philosopher, simply had a different set of problems with Christianity than his contemporaries. 
48 Eusebius. EH.6.36.2. Such labeling had apparently become de rigueur by the fourth century.  Chadwick 
notes that calling someone an “Epicurean” in Late Antiquity was tantamount to using the term “Fascist” 
today.  See “Introduction” in Contra Celsum, p. xxvi. 
49 The term pagan, from the Latin paganus meaning ‘country-dweller’ or ‘rustic’ is generally a pejorative 
term of Christian apologetic provenance.  The more cumbrous locution “non-Christian” or the imprecise 
adjective “Greek” are at least more felicitous choices because they do not come from a position of 
Christian theological criticism.  For a defense of using the term ‘pagan’, see P. Athanassiadi and M. Frede 
(1999) pp. 4-5.  They argue, unconvincingly I think, that the term ‘pagan’ “despite its strong pejorative 
connotations…appears as the least unsatisfactory term to describe the adepts of non-Judaeo-Christian 
religions in the Greater Mediterranean in antiquity.”  They reject ‘heathen’, derivative of e0qniko/v as 
being more strongly pejorative.  
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uninformed and unsophisticated.”50  He may not have been a profound philosopher, but he 
was the only non-Christian of the period that we know of who took enough pains to read 
some Christian literature quite thoroughly and devise a critique. 
The sophistication of Celsus’ polemic is due in part to his rhetorical skills and 
education, but the real power of his attack is due to his knowledge and familiarity with 
Christian and Jewish Scriptures.  Celsus does not mention the popular criticism against 
Christianity circulating in the second century; there is no reference to bacchanalian orgies, 
cannibalism, incest or the other catalogue of stereotypes we find in the extant literature of 
that time period.51  Celsus must have seen that these critiques would not have lasting power 
beyond rhetorical effect, so his polemic engages in a critique, among other things, of 
Christian Scripture.  His knowledge of Judeo-Christian texts included the Epistle of 
Barnabas, the Book of Enoch, Matthew and Genesis—a limited reading to be sure, but 
nonetheless an advance on his predecessors’ knowledge.52   
Some scholars think that the 2nd century apologists had read Celsus’ True Doctrine and 
were replying to it indirectly in the apologetic literature.  This may be the case, but there is 
little clear evidence to substantiate this beyond imaginative readings of innuendo and 
suggestion internal to the texts.  The Contra Celsum was the first direct and sustained response 
to the specific charges of Celsus’ attack, but it was written nearly 80 years after Celsus’ True 
Doctrine.  It is not clear how much damage the True Doctrine had on the efforts of Christian 
missionaries, but clearly it was taken seriously enough by Origen that he devoted eight books 
to respond to the charges.   
                                                          
50 See the rather dismissive account of Frede in Apologetics in the Roman Empire (1999), pp. 154-55. 
51 See Simmons, Michael Bland.  “Graeco-Roman Philosophical Opposition” in The Early Christian 
World v. 2. ed. By Philip F. Esler.  London: Routledge, 2000.  p. 845. 
52 See Esler, p. 846. 
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iii. Origen’s Training and The Purpose of the Contra Celsum  
 Origen had received excellent training for responding to Celsus’ True Doctrine.  He 
was appointed head of the catechetical school at Alexandria ca. 206 due to his reputation as a 
polymath.53  Concurrent with the beginning of the persecutions under governor Aquila 
between 206 and 211, Origen began to teach Christian doctrine to potential proselytes.54  He 
apparently had a considerable amount of freedom to learn and teach a variety of non-
Christian sources to his pupils since the school did not have a fixed curriculum.  From 
Porphyry we have the testimony that Origen had studied under the renowned non-Christian 
Ammonius Saccas, from whom he “benefited greatly” despite the fact that, as Porphyry 
notes, he had “apostatized to an audacious and barbarous creed [i.e. Christianity].”55  We also 
know that the catechetical school included a great deal of extra-Christian material in its 
curriculum, which helped Origen deal effectively with a Hellenistic author. 
 Adolf von Harnack’s view of the catechetical school in Alexandria was that it was the 
nerve center of Christian rationalism, so capable of persuading non-Christians that it 
“overthrew polytheism by scientific means, while at the same time it conserved anything of 
                                                          
53 Eusebius thought it was around 203, see Hist. Eccl. 6.3.3.  For a discussion of the later date and Origen’s 
education specifically, see Roelof van den Broek “The Christian ‘School’ of Alexandria” in Centres of 
Learning: Learning and Location in Pre-Modern Europe and the Near East.  Ed. By Jan Willem Drijvers 
and Alasdair A. MacDonald.  Leiden: Brill, 1995, pp. 39-47.  For a discussion of the purpose of the 
Alexandrian school, see Robert L. Wilken “Alexandria: A School for Training in Virtue” in Schools of 
Thought in the Christian Tradition. Ed by Patrick Henry.  Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984, pp.15-30. 
54 Van den Broek, p. 44 
55 Eusebius.  Hist. Eccl. 6.19.6-7  Mark Edwards notes that Porphyry’s purpose here is to show that 
Origen’s “instruction in Greek philosophy was so perfect that he deserved to be called a greek; hence his 
adherence in his maturity to the Christian faith could be deemed by rhetorical licence an apostasy” p. 173 
in “Ammonius, Teacher of Origen.”  The Journal of Ecclesiastical History.  Vol. 44, No. 2.  Incidentally, 
Edwards’ larger purpose here is to argue that Ammonius was not Origen’s teacher, a view that only 
Heinrich Dörrie has advanced.  For a discussion of Ammonius Saccas in detail, see Frederic M. Schroeder 
“Ammonius Saccas” in Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt Part II, Vol. 36.1, pp.493-526. 
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value in Greek science and culture.”56  It would be very difficult to determine and then 
demonstrate the causal links between the reception of the Contra Celsum among Hellenistic 
readers and any subsequent conversion to Christianity.  Harnack saw the apologetic literature 
coming out of the Alexandrian school as successful presumably because it employed more 
rational means of argumentation than non-Christian polemics.  It is a warranted inference to 
suggest that the increased level of conversions in the third century had much to do with 
Christian interaction with Greek culture and learning—Justin Martyr being a prime example.  
 The purpose of writing such a voluminous response to this recently deceased critic 
of Christianity was, on the surface, a simple issue of responding to the request of his wealthy 
patron Ambrose.57  Ambrose was a former Valentinian Christian who had been converted by 
Origen58 and was his primary patron, supplying him with seven stenographers to whom he 
dictated the voluminous Contra Celsum.  Origen once referred to Ambrose as “God’s 
taskmaster,” indicating that he received Ambrose’s patronage ambivalently.59  One can 
surmise that Ambrose’s purpose in commissioning the Contra Celsum was to provide the 
Christian community with a learned and authoritative response to a dangerous critic of the 
faith.  
Origen’s preface is replete with disclaimers about the purpose and necessity of the 
Contra Celsum.  He notes that Jesus was “silent when false witnesses spoke against him” since 
“he was convinced that all his life and actions among the Jews were better than any speech 
in refutation of the false witness and superior to any words that he might say in reply to 
                                                          
56 Qtd. In Wilken (1984), p. 16. The source was Harnack’s treatment of Origen in the Lehrbuch der 
Dogmengeschichte. 
57 CC Preface, 1 
58 See Eusebius, EH. 6.18.1. 
59 From the Commentary on John, Book V, qtd. in Crouzel, p. 13. 
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accusations.”60  Presumably, the moral example of Jesus in the gospels makes formal 
argumentation seem like so much sophistry.  It would seem that Origen has precluded 
rational argumentation.  But he clearly gives it a major role in his own defense of 
Christianity, because—as he tells us—some weaker Christians are in need of it.  
Origen claimed that Celsus’ True Doctrine was a poorly written and intellectually 
vacuous text, so obtuse that it could not even be characterized as fallacious in philosophical 
terms.61  What he meant by this latter point was that to even commit a logical fallacy in 
philosophy was suggestive of some skill, and that Celsus could not even attain to such a 
minimal requirement.  Despite this ad hominem attack, it is not clear that Origen truly thought 
Celsus was “uninformed and unsophisticated.”  Writing an eight-book response to Celsus—
a laborious, time-consuming, and expensive endeavor to be sure—would not have been the 
best way to demonstrate the judgment that Celsus was a weak opponent.  The difficulty here 
may be in the reader’s eagerness to take the surface meaning of Origen’s rhetoric at face 
value.  It is one thing to disarm an opponent by ad hominem attacks; it is quite another to go 
on ad nauseum against that opponent, expending great energy in the process while 
simultaneously maintaining that the opponent is unworthy of any substantive response.  The 
reader also must not forget that the only source for the True Doctrine is the Contra Celsum 
itself, which means that Origen had the prerogative to edit the order and flow of Celsus’ 
own argument.  
So, the Contra Celsum was born of a disagreement between a Christian and a Greek 
philosopher.  On one side we have Celsus who thought “It makes no difference whether one 
calls the supreme God by the name used among the Greeks, or by that, for example, used 
                                                          
60 Ibid. 
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among the Indians, or by that among the Egyptians.”62  On the other side we have Origen 
who believed that the Incarnation meant that God’s salvific power was available to all 
human beings.  It was this particularism of Christian belief—the idea that God had been 
incarnate in only one human being—which scandalized Celsus.  The theological 
disagreement between Origen and Celsus was about the means by which divinity was 
expressed to human beings.  Celsus sees in Origen and the Christian movement a strong 
arrogance about truth, exemplified by their belief that there is only one God.  His complaint 
is that in Christianity, a jealous and unjustifiably arrogant monotheism has arisen that 
threatens the very social fabric of the Roman Empire. 
 The genre of the Contra Celsum is generally considered to be that of the so-called 
apologetic kind.  The genre had a considerable heritage in the second century with Justin 
Martyr, Clement, Tatian, and Theophilus, but Origen was the first to write an apology 
specifically addressing a particular text written by a specific author.  The word “apology” is 
derived from the noun apologia (apologia) and is cognate with the verb apologein 
(apologein) which mean “a speech of defense” and “to make a defense” respectively.63  The 
usual setting for a formal apologia was the courtroom64, and in some sense the apologetic 
nature of the Contra Celsum resembles a courtroom setting.  Propositions are presented and 
systematically rebutted with lengthy argumentation and presentations of evidence; but of 
course the “court” here is the implied reader of the text.  As Frede has noted, Origen used 
                                                                                                                                                                             
61 CC Preface, 5 
62 CC 1.24 cf. 5.41 
63 The editors of Apologetics in the Roman Empire. (1999) defined apologetic as “the defence of a cause 
or party supposed to be of paramount importance to the speaker.” P. 1 
64 See Frede’s discussion, pp. 136-7. 
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the verb apologein five times in the opening preface of the Contra Celsum, thus signaling the 
overtly apologetic structure of the text.65   
The Contra Celsum  is in many ways quite different from Origen’s other works,  in 
large part because it is a polemical text meant to answer the charges of a non-Christian.  Its 
tone and content are, accordingly, dramatically different from a homiletical discourse or a 
mystical excursus.  This is not to say that the Contra Celsum does not feature many kinds of 
non-literal readings—which so characterize the other texts.66  However, the purpose of these 
readings is different.  They are aimed at lessening the offence of Scripture’s surface meanings 
and at seizing the interpretative terrain from Celsus.  The tone of the Contra Celsum is not the 
pious setting of a homily, but the public defense of Christian ideas against the cultural 
opponents of Christianity. 
 Early in Book I, Origen says that he is writing his response to Celsus not so much 
for Christians—except those “weak in faith”—but for “those entirely without experience of 
faith in Christ.”67  There are several elements in the text that implicitly support this claim.  
One can reasonably assume that a believing Christian in the 3rd century was not the primary 
target audience of the Contra Celsum because the subject of the text was a response to an anti-
Christian polemic written by a Greek intellectual.  Furthermore, the arguments in the text 
presuppose a lack of familiarity with Christian doctrine and theology on the part of the 
reader.  Another factor here is that Origen continually compares and contrasts Christianity 
                                                          
65 Ibid. p. 136. 
66 I take “literal” to mean not the objective meaning of a text, given to any reader despite their leanings, 
but a highly contingent reading of a text that is taken by the reader to be the clear meaning, the “surface” 
meaning.  What the text really means will rarely be the focus here; rather we will be interested in looking at 
what Origen and Celsus took the text to really mean.  Such readings were contested and just as historically 
contingent as the readers themselves.  As we will see for Origen, “literal” names the most basic, often 
superficial account of a text’s meaning.  But literal meanings often have plenty of non-literal elements like 
figurative speech and metaphorical language.  
 26
with Hellenistic culture and religion.  This seems to imply that the intended audience was 
educated non-Christians.  All of these factors help substantiate the claim that the Contra 
Celsum was a defense of Christianity meant to proselytize Greek intellectuals.  It is also quite 
likely that it was written to justify Christian belief and practices to the governing elites in the 
Roman Empire. 
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V.   Argumentative Structure of the Contra Celsum 
 The structure of the Contra Celsum consists of quotations from Celsus’ True Doctrine 
and Origen’s response to each quotation.  The result is a rather rambling apologetic tour de 
force in which each major criticism of Christianity by Celsus is addressed, sometimes with 
considerable overlap between sections.  The division of the books was apparently not 
planned out in a rigorous way at all; rather, it seems most likely that Origen simply ended 
each book when the physical end of the scroll on which he was dictating the response had 
been reached.  The lack of systematic planning is also seen in Origen’s gradual realization 
that his opponent was not an Epicurean.  As he penetrated into the core of the arguments, 
he found himself revising previous assessments that he had not carefully planned out before. 
 Origen’s debt to the apologists of the second century was quite significant, but his 
own style and intellectual skills were different from his predecessors in many ways.  Thus, we 
will find that with one major exception, the structure and logic of the arguments employed 
in the Contra Celsum owed their provenance—if not their particular expression here—to the 
earlier apologetic literature and a vast panoply of Hellenistic sources.  An examination of the 
rhetorical techniques of the Contra Celsum can lead us to a more nuanced view of how 
Christian discourse was manufactured and what the major presuppositions of that discourse 
were. 
 Essential to Celsus’ assault on Christianity was his belief that the most egregious 
error committed by Christians was their misanthropic and arrogant rejection of a program of 
ancient truth.  This august truth emerges as uniform and totalizing in Celsus’ vision: “There 
is an ancient doctrine which has existed from the beginning, which has always been 
 28
maintained by the wisest nations and cities and wise men.”68  The primary objective of 
Celsus’ critique was to portray Christianity as a faddish religion, contrasted unfavorably with 
a Hellenistic culture steeped in great antiquity and buttressed by traditional mores.  In direct 
contrast to the purported novelty of Christianity, Celsus claims that he has “nothing new to 
say, but only ancient doctrines.”69  
 This “ancient doctrine” was basically a Platonist account of divinity, which held that 
God is “good and beautiful and happy, and exists in the most beautiful state.”70  Implicit 
within this doctrine was a rejection of Christian Incarnational theology since, if God “comes 
down to men, He must undergo change, a change from good to bad, from beautiful to 
shameful, from happiness to misfortune…Accordingly, God could not be capable of 
undergoing this change.”71  Celsus believed that the Christians—with their belief that God 
had become flesh in Jesus—were foolish because the eternal God could not become flesh.  
At the heart of Celsus’ critique was a strong revulsion towards Christian anthropomorphism 
that was embodied in the Christian belief that Jesus was divinized human flesh.  Origen 
countered this by arguing for a divide between Christ’s human and divine elements.  
 
i.  Argument from Antiquity 
Celsus’ emphasis on a perennially reoccurring ancient truth was a good occasion for 
Origen to use the argument from antiquity.  We have of course seen this theme in many 
varieties in the writers surveyed above, but since our focus is on the Contra Celsum, it will be 
helpful to clarify its presuppositions and implications for Origen’s discourse.  For Origen, 
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the argument from antiquity presupposed that truth arose purely and completely in a most 
antique past, and that if one could trace one’s own culture back to that past then one had the 
right to claim intellectual and religious supremacy.  The implicit presupposition behind the 
proof from antiquity is that in the halcyon days of great antiquity, truth was singular and 
pure, unvarnished by outside influences.  All later formulations of truth were, at best, weaker 
derivations. 
 Origen’s debt to Josephus’ Contra Apionem is clear in the passages where the proof 
from antiquity is a salient feature. Christian apologists had long adapted this theme used by 
Josephus to fit their own polemical agendas in order to argue that Christianity was the 
expression of great antiquity, hence responsible for all that was good and true in later 
traditions.  This general observation has been amply reflected in the historiographical writing 
about the period, but there have been few detailed analyses of the development of the 
antiquity argument in Origen.72  The origin of the tradition was not, as it might be supposed, 
with Josephus, rather it can at least be traced back to the Egyptian historians before the 
Common Era.  Philosophically, it might find its intellectual genesis in Hesiod’s notion of a 
golden age that gave way to increasingly unsophisticated and depraved periods of history.    
Regardless of its provenance, by the time of Celsus’ True Doctrine, it clearly was a 
well-established polemical device that was generally taken for granted.  When Celsus 
describes Christianity as a late-breaking religious tradition, as a novelty and an innovation on 
a sacred and received body of truth, he is claiming that Christianity is vastly inferior to 
ancient Greek culture.  Both Origen and Celsus claimed that their own culture was more 
ancient.  As a result, Origen’s problem with Celsus’ assertion that an ancient doctrine existed 
                                                          
72 See Droge, p. 8 
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was not at all about the internal merits of the argument itself since he clearly agreed with 
Celsus that such doctrines do exist.  Rather, his disagreement arose due to Celsus’ exclusion 
of the Jews and the Christians from the list of people who received these ancient doctrines. 
Origen’s usage of the argument from antiquity is concurrent with his realization that if 
Celsus would not admit the Jews into the exclusive circle of people who have access to truth, 
then the Christians were ruled out as well. For both thinkers then, the judgment was the 
same: to arrive late on the scene of history within an already existing culture was tantamount 
to being subordinate to that culture, and thus inferior. 
 By the time of the Contra Celsum, Origen believed that the historiography concerning 
the antiquity of the Jews was so solid and well established that he could simply refer to the 
authoritativeness of previous historians’ work as proof of his argument.  The apologists of 
the second century had stabilized the argument so well that by Origen’s time he thought it 
was “superfluous to quote them here”; instead he simply refers the reader to the 
unquestioned witness of Josephus’ Contra Apionem and even Tatian’s Oratio ad Graecos.73  
Celsus frustrates Origen’s attempts to make the antiquity argument by separating Judaism 
from Christianity.  If the Christians had really nothing to do with Judaism then they could 
not use the antiquity of Judaism to support their own religious claims.  
 The effectiveness of Celsus’ attack on the vulgar novelty of Christianity can be seen 
early in Book I when Celsus describes Jesus as the organizer of the Christian movement, 
emphasizing that it was only “a very few years ago [that] he [that is, Jesus] taught this 
doctrine and was considered by the Christians to be son of God.”74  Why should we believe 
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in Jesus and his religion if he was so recently alive?  Origen’s response will be that despite 
Jesus’ recent activity, the meaning of his life’s work embodied ancient truths. 
 The argument from antiquity is spread rather sporadically throughout the Contra 
Celsum.  Despite this, there is a rather predictable pattern that begins to emerge in those 
sections: Celsus will accuse the Christians of plagiarizing some Hellenistic idea or practice 
and Origen will counter with the claim that the antiquity of Christianity—via Judaism—
precludes plagiarism.  Naturally it is the Greeks who were guilty of such borrowing.  For 
example, Celsus thinks that the Christians had “misunderstood the doctrine of the Greeks 
and barbarians” concerning conflagrations and floods, and that Moses had merely taken 
Deucalion’s flood and used it in his own account.75  Origen’s strategy here, as elsewhere, is 
simply to claim that even though “Celsus has read widely and shows that he knows many 
stories, he failed to give attention to the antiquity of Moses…”76   
To say that Moses is earlier than any Greek thinker is to say that any truth in Greek 
culture is a derivation from the fount of Mosaic wisdom.  This means that the establishment 
of truth is contingent upon the demonstration of antiquity.  Contemporary Christians who 
trace their own late-breaking understandings of the tradition back to the earliest possible 
period are also presupposing that truth is purest in its earliest historical expression, and that 
the accumulation of history only takes us farther away from that pure origin.  The theology 
of history implicit here is perhaps of a species with Hesiod’s account of a golden age in a 
remote antique past, which later cultures can only hope to imitate in their inevitable decline 
from truth. 
                                                          
75 CC 4.11 
76 ibid.  cf. CC 5.15 where Origen alleges that the doctrine of a world-conflagration was “probably” 
borrowed from the Hebrews by the Greeks. CC 6.43 wherein Origen counters Celsus’ claim that the 
notion of Satan was stolen from the Greek poets.  See also 6.47; 7.28 
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 Celsus also claims that Moses took the story of Phaethon and applied it to the 
Sodom and Gomorrah narrative, which Origen counters simply by observing that once 
again, Celsus had “failed to notice the evidence of Moses’ antiquity.”77  Disparaging the 
cultural and philosophical integrity of Judaism was damaging enough to Christian identity, 
but Celsus was aware of an even more dangerous argument.  He saw clearly enough that to 
disassociate Christianity from Judaism was to remove the historical and theological basis for 
Christian belief.  Not surprisingly, then, he argues that the “Christians also add certain 
doctrines to those maintained by the Jews, and assert that the Son of God has already come 
on account of the sins of the Jews, and that because the Jews punished Jesus and gave him 
gall to drink they drew upon themselves the bitter anger of God.”78  The power of Celsus’ 
argument rests in its strategy of dissociating Christianity from Judaism, thus destroying the 
premises of the argument from antiquity.  Insofar as this strategy could work, it would have 
shaken the entire foundation of Christian apologetics, which explains Origen’s vehement 
opposition to it. 
 Such a devastating critique could not go unanswered, but it put Origen in a difficult 
position.  He had to argue for a basic historical continuity between Judaism and Christianity, 
while simultaneously distancing Christianity from living Judaism.  Instead of arguing for 
basic affinities between contemporary Judaism and Christianity, Origen simply reaffirms the 
anti-Judaism of early Christianity that Celsus had observed.  One clear example of anti-
Judaism in the Contra Celsum is Origen’s usage of the myth of deicide: “I challenge anyone to 
prove my statement untrue if I say that the entire Jewish nation was destroyed less than one 
                                                          
77 CC 4.21.  Celsus has to stretch the narrative slightly to make the comparison: Phaethon, Helios’ son 
chartered his chariot to close to earth almost causing a conflagration, but there is no narrative of judgment 
on human evil.  
78 CC 4.22 
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whole generation later on account of these sufferings which they inflicted upon Jesus.”79  So, 
even though there are clear and vitally important connections between Judaism and 
Christianity, those connections do not mean that contemporary Jews are better off than 
Christians.  The relationship between Judaism and Christianity in the Contra Celsum is 
superficial, because it is predicated almost wholly on texts.80  
The arguments about antiquity are perhaps the least enlightening examples of 
philosophical argumentation in the Contra Celsum.  We have already observed that both 
Origen and Celsus shared many of the same presuppositions, namely that their own culture 
could lay claim to an antique provenance and thus have an exclusive hold on truth.  When 
accusations of cultural theft or plagiarism occur, they are merely reversed and hurled back at 
the accuser based on the proof from antiquity.  The predictable structure emerges in a typical 
example: take Celsus’ view of the ancient Jews, who “were totally uneducated and had not 
heard of these things which were sung in poetry long before by Hesiod and thousands of other 
inspired men.”81  The Jews had crafted a dubious and childish story about humans being 
physically formed by God and a crafty serpent who easily leads them into deception, all of 
which is guilty of “making God into a weakling right from the beginning” and most 
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80 Peter J. Gorday has argued that despite the appearance of anti-Judaism in the Contra Celsum, Origen was 
“eirenic in his view of Judaism” (p. 333).  See his “Moses and Jesus in Contra Celsum” in Origen of 
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overwhelming textual evidence seems to suggest that this view of Judaism, was still, as I said above, a view 
of a “textualized” Judaism.  That is to say, a Judaism that one encounters in the Old Testament as 
interpreted by Christians.  
81 CC 4.36 Italics added. 
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offensive.82  Origen’s response is by this point de rigueur, he finds it amusing that Celsus could 
ignore the clear and distinctly evident fact that Moses lived “long before the Trojan war.”83 
 The argument from antiquity had many concomitant themes as have already been 
seen with the second century apologists.  Recall the popular assertion, first made by 
Egyptian historians, then picked up by the Jews and Christians, that the Greek philosophers 
had brought back ancient wisdom to Greece from Egypt after their stint as Egyptian 
tourists.  Origen’s rare usage of this particular theme surfaces in a classic example of a 
Christian appropriation of a non-Christian text.  In response to Celsus’ belittling of the 
serpent character in Genesis 3, Origen attempts to dispel its absurdity by comparing it to 
Plato’s Symposium.    
To do this, Origen allegorizes Plato.  He wants to show that the Genesis narrative is 
not as absurd as Celsus had supposed, and he does this in two basic ways.  First, he argues 
that Plato had borrowed heavily from Moses for his own philosophical purposes.  Secondly, 
he claims that the surface literal meaning of Plato’s text is quite absurd.  Surface meanings in 
general are the kinds of shallow readings that only superficial readers are prone to make.  
Origen imagines that the surface meaning of the birth of Eros in Plato’s Symposium would 
make anybody  
“ridicule the myth and make a mock of so great a man as Plato.  But if they 
could find Plato’s meaning by examining philosophically what he expresses in 
the form of a myth, they would admire the way in which he was able to hide 
the great doctrines as he saw them in the form of a myth on account of the 
multitude, and yet to say what was necessary for those who know how to 
discover from myths the true significance by their author.”84 
 
                                                          
82 ibid. 
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The “great doctrines” hidden so expertly in Plato’s text are veiled references to the Garden 
of Eden and the serpent.  By delving past the superficial covering of the text, Origen is 
claiming that Celsus’ mistake was in not thinking as deeply as Christians do about their own 
texts.  If Celsus could go deeper, he would see all the rich allusions that Plato had made to 
Moses’ writings.  How did Plato gain access to Moses’ wisdom?  Origen thinks that Plato 
had traveled to Egypt and perhaps read the Pentateuch there.  “It is not clear” he comments 
“whether Plato happened to hit on these matters by chance, or whether, as some think, on 
his visit to Egypt he met even with those who interpret the Jews traditions 
philosophically.”85   
The proof from antiquity was an investment in the weight and authority of 
traditionalism.  A.H. Armstrong has noted that for Origen and many of his co-religionists, 
the weight and authority of tradition was a strong determinant of truth.  He cautions modern 
readers that they might miss this point because, as he puts it, “We are too deeply affected by 
a sense of historical relativity to accept the teaching of any traditional authority as absolutely 
definitive and all-sufficient…”86  Whether or not the argument from antiquity seems quaint 
and foolish to us today, it certainly was a powerfully persuasive argument for Origen and 
Celsus.   
                                                          
85 ibid.  cf. CC 6.19 where Plato is alleged to have borrowed “the words of the Phaedrus from some 
Hebrews.” 
86 A.H. Armstrong, op cit. p. 431.  Cf. Pierre Hadot’s Philosophy as a Way of Life, ed. Arnold I. Davidson.  
Blackwell: Oxford, 1995.  Hadot writes “Philosophers of the modern era, from the seventeenth to the 
beginning of the nineteenth centuries, refused the argument from authority and abandoned the exegetical 
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Origen certainly accepts the weight of his Christianized reading of the Jewish tradition, but the notion of a 
simple acceptance of a ‘ready-made truth’, while possibly implicit in some passages, is hardly pervasive.  
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ii.  Moral Effect Argument 
Another major argument in the Contra Celsum is what I’m calling the “moral effect” 
argument, which has several components.  For Origen, the argument arises to give a 
criterion of judgment to properly adjudicate between Christian and non-Christian truth 
claims.  It is a rather expansive category of argumentation, ranging from the reasons for why 
one might believe in such things as the historicity of miracles, the divinity of Jesus, to basic 
judgments concerning the more general truth of philosophy and religion.   
Origen realized that to simply hurl Christian beliefs at a non-believer as if it were 
self-evidently true, without any arguments or reasons, would be woefully inadequate for his 
polemical purposes.  He had to give reasons that would count as such in non-Christian 
settings.  Accordingly, he argued that the basic difference between Greek and Christian 
religion was fundamentally a moral issue.  He believed that pagan divination and miracles 
certainly do occur, but they have no telos, no moral goal that believers can follow after in the 
hopes of spiritual reformation.  Jesus’ ministry and miracles were true and exceptional 
because they were directed towards a unitary and clear objective: the complete moral 
reformation of human beings.  Non-Christian miracles serve no clear moral purpose.  In 
fact, they are often morally destructive. 
The moral effect argument was very important for Origen’s defense of Jesus against 
Celsus’ aspersions.  Celsus was very dubious about the Christian claim that Jesus was divine.  
When confronted with this skepticism, Origen argued that  
                                                                                                                                                                             
Instead, one finds Origen struggling to make the received truths intelligible to a non-Christian audience, 
and in formulating these, he makes them in some sense his own. 
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“if any man were able to deliver souls from the flood of evil and from 
licentiousness and wrongdoing and from despising God, and were to give as 
a proof of this work one hundred reformed characters…could one 
reasonably say that it was without divine help that this man had implanted in 
the hundred men a doctrine capable of delivering them from evils of such 
magnitude?”87   
 
One should not take it for granted that Jesus was divine.  A likely proof of this divinity was 
the increased morality brought on by Jesus’ activities.  Of course, it seems unlikely that 
Origen and Celsus would have agreed on the presence of moral reformation in Christians’ 
lives, but Origen thought it was obvious.   
 Celsus prompts this response again when he has a hypothetical Jew88 cast doubt on 
Jesus’ divinity by alleging that many other religious charlatans had claimed to be a “son of 
God.”  Origen admits that many people had claimed to be divine, but very few people 
currently worship these so-called messiahs.  Simon Magus was one person who had made 
such extravagant claims, “but now of all the Simonians in the world it is possible, I believe, 
to find thirty, and perhaps I have exaggerated the number.”89  The assumption here is that if 
Simon Magus truly were divine, then he would have had a more pragmatic moral effect on 
people.    
 Precisely what aspersions did Celsus cast on Jesus?  One thing that Celsus found 
distasteful was Jesus’ willingness to associate with people of ill repute.  Celsus accuses Jesus 
of being a leader of “infamous men…the most wicked tax-collectors and sailors” to which 
Origen agreed that Jesus had in fact called sinners to his ministry, but he saw nothing 
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88 Throughout Books I and II, Origen has chosen the sections of Celsus’ True Doctrine wherein Celsus 
presented a Jew as a mouthpiece for his polemic.  It is effective because Celsus is attacking the perceived 
disparity between Christianity and Judaism, and having a textual Jew make the charges must have seemed 
more damaging to the Christians from Celsus’ perspective.  Origen exploits this device when Celsus has 
the Jew say things that are unlikely utterances from a representative of Judaism.  
89 CC 1.57 
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intrinsically wrong with that since it is especially sinners that need moral reformation.90  In 
fact, what better way to show Jesus’ power than to lead such wicked men like the disciples to 
“the purest moral character”?91  It is likely that Origen is implicitly critiquing Celsus’ elitism 
here, since Celsus’ tastes were offended by Jesus’ involvement with people of questionable 
character.  Origen brilliantly reveals the hypocrisy of Celsus’ critique by appealing to similar 
examples from the Greek philosophical tradition.  
 For example, Socrates had led his disciple Phaedo out of dire moral straits.  
Xenocrates’ successor Polemo had led a most depraved life before converting to 
philosophy.92  Why should these men be so very different from the disciples of Jesus in that 
regard?  After all, philosophy is only useful insofar as it helps other humans.  Origen argued 
that all philosophy “should be approved on the ground that its doctrine in those who 
persuaded them had the power to change men from such evils although they had previously 
been gripped by them.”93  There are few such examples in philosophical history of dramatic 
moral reformation, especially when compared with the many examples found in the Gospels.  
 So, we have seen how the moral effect argument served as a criterion for judging the 
claims about Jesus’ divinity and the pragmatic utility of philosophy.  Let us briefly examine 
how Origen also extends the argument to Greek religion.  Celsus wondered why the 
Christians saw Jesus as so exceptional.  After all, a god becoming human in Greek religion 
was not especially unique.  Why should one worship the Christian god as if he were unique 
when you had so many older and better deities like Asclepius, Dionysus or Heracles?   
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Origen responds by arguing that the Greek gods had done much less to help 
humanity when compared with Jesus: “What work as great as his [i.e. Jesus] has been done 
by Asclepius, Dionysus and Heracles?  Can they support their claim to be gods by proving 
that there are people who have been reformed in morals and have become better as a result 
of their life and teaching?”94  The answer to these rhetorical questions is a resounding “no.”  
The Greek myths, on Origen’s reading, are simply immoral catalogues of human, all too 
human sin.  Indeed, the Greek stories are so distasteful that one must use allegorical readings 
to make them less offensive.  Who would not want to seek “refuge in allegory” after reading 
of “divine sons” who “castrate their divine fathers”?95  It is in Greek mythology that one can 
read that “A father has sexual intercourse with his daughter.”96  None of these stories can be 
seen as morally helpful.  Origen is saying, “Who is edified by these stories?” 
 Origen’s disgust with Greek mythology was not shared by Celsus.  Celsus viewed the 
divine births of the Greek gods Perseus, Amphion, Aeacus and Minos as “evidence of their 
great and truly wonderful works for mankind,” and he wonders “what have you [i.e. the 
Christians] done in word or deed that is fine or wonderful?”97  Origen predictably claims that 
Celsus was in fact wrong about the deeds of the Greek deities. He claims that even if such 
deeds had been done, they would pale in comparison with the good deeds of Jesus.  
 Presented with such arguments, many non-Christians would undoubtedly have 
agreed with the critique of the Greek deities that Origen advanced in the Contra Celsum, but 
not with the implications that he drew from it—namely, that Christianity was better.  The 
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95 CC 4.48 
96 Ibid.  Origen does not mention the Jewish analogue to Greek incest, namely in Genesis 19:30-38—
wherein Lot’s daughters, apparently convinced that they are the last living survivors of divine destruction, 
entice their father into drunken procreation.   
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philosophical critique of “superstitious” and anthropomorphic religion that he employs 
already had a long history by the time he was writing.98  Plato had famously banished Homer 
from the Republic for the immorality and anthropomorphism of the gods depicted in his 
poetry.99  The Platonic critique of anthropomorphism was based upon the belief that God, 
being completely incorporeal, was separated from the world of materiality and becoming.  
Another integral component of Platonism was the belief in divine immutability, which 
complemented the emphasis on incorporeality, since the highest divinity, being necessarily 
spiritual, could not come into being or pass away.   
The Platonic god could not, in short, be human in any way shape or form.  This 
lends itself naturally to a strong suspicion of anthropomorphizing divine beings; hence the 
notion of a Zeus coming down to the human realm and procreating with women would 
have been anathema to many philosophers, and not just to Christians and Jews.  This 
appropriation of the Platonic evaluation of divine incorporeality by Christians was an 
important step towards establishing persuasive discourse since this bridged the gap between 
Christians and philosophically minded Greeks.  
  The Christian usage of the traditional critique of licentiousness and immorality in 
Greek mythology was not aimed at denying the existence of the gods—as some 
contemporary readers might suspect.  Instead of being denied their existence, the gods were 
demoted to the status of demons.  The social institutions that were organized around 
them—the cultic practices, the mantic frenzies and divine afflatus of the oracles—were all 
reinterpreted as the immoral fabrications of very real demonic forces.  We have already seen 
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98 See Attridge, Harold W.  “The Philosophical Critique of Religion under the Early Empire.” In Aufstief 
und Niedergang der Romischen Welt.  Walter de Gruyter: Berlin, 1978, pp. 45-78. Also see Veyne, P. (1988). 
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the subordination of the Greek gods to daemons in the writings of Justin and Tatian, and 
Origen is simply following the apologetic tradition.  So, Origen had plenty of material to 
draw upon when he wanted to critique Greek religion.  But he does not merely lambaste the 
Greek stories for their immorality; he thinks there are additional reasons for looking 
elsewhere for one’s edification. 
 At one point in the Contra Celsum, Origen proposes a tabula rasa to sympathetic 
readers who are interested in deciding between Christian and non-Christian stories.  “Let us 
compare them all with one another,” Origen proclaims, “and consider the aim which those 
who caused them to be written had in view, and resulting help or harm, or neither, to those 
who were the recipients of the supposed benefits.”100  It looks like Origen assumed that after 
reflecting on this question, the hypothetical reader here would agree that the Christian stories 
were clearly more beneficial than the Greek stories.  Origen is saying that reasonable people 
would agree that Christian stories were clearly aimed at helping readers, while Greek stories 
were not.  Origen clearly believes that there are convincing and salient truths about 
Christianity that will just thrust themselves upon the reader, despite that reader’s 
predispositions.     
 Another way in which Celsus attempted to discredit Jesus’ divine status was to 
disparage him as a false magician, as nothing more than a cheap miracle maker.  When 
Celsus claims that Jesus was a mere sorcerer, it should be clear by now that Origen has a 
ready response.  He argues, “But in fact no sorcerer uses his tricks to call the spectators to 
moral reformation…nor does he attempt to persuade the onlookers to live as men who will 
                                                                                                                                                                             
99 Plato The Republic 398a 
100 CC 8.47 italics added. 
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be judged by God.”101  Celsus repeats this accusation of sorcery many times throughout the 
text, and Origen’s response is always the same; sorcerers are not interested in inducing moral 
reformation in people.102  Many men claim to be messiahs and sons of God; many perform 
miracles as proof of such claims; but the trustworthiness of Jesus should be apparent to all 
by virtue of the fact that “Christ and his disciples bore fruit not in deceit but in the salvation 
of souls.”103  The moral effect argument is used to systematically trump any argument that 
Celsus made concerning the dubious character of Jesus and the nature of Jesus’ miracles. 
 Now, Origen and Celsus were not skeptical about the possibility of miracles 
occurring; they were more concerned with what purpose the miracles served.104 Origen does 
not remain agnostic concerning the occurrence of miracles; rather he offers a criterion for 
preferring Christian miracles to non-Christian ones.  The Christian miracles, simply put, help 
morally reform people, while non-Christian miracles serve very little purpose.  Disputes 
often arise in the Contra Celsum about miracles, and they generally revolved around two types 
of questions: what was the cause of a given miracle and how does one know the cause?  The 
cause of Christian miracles is the power of the Christian God; while the non-Christian 
miracles arise from the malevolent workings of daemons.  We have the answer to our first 
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question about the causes behind miracles.  Now, how does one know that this is indeed the 
cause?105   
  
Celsus attacked Jesus’ miracles by suggesting that it was difficult to know if any 
trustworthy witness of the miracles truly existed.  Commenting on the transfiguration, Celsus 
wonders “What trustworthy witness saw this apparition…? There is no proof except for your 
word and the evidence which you may produce of one of the men who were punished with 
                                                          
105 There was some disagreement about the reliability of sense perceptions and general epistemological 
questions in the Hellenistic era.  Pyrrho, the founder of skepticism, held that true knowledge was 
impossible because the nature of the world is indeterminate.  Indeterminacy resulted not from any 
inherent flaw in our sensory and cognitive apparatuses, but from the general lack of availability of facts 
themselves.  As a result, we should be “unopinionated, uncommitted and unwavering, saying concerning 
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 The Epicureans, on the other hand, gave much more credence to the possibility of knowledge by 
arguing that our sense-perceptions are always true, but our judgments about them are not (See Lucretius, 
ibid. pp. 78-79.) The kanon for determining truth was a combination of sensations, preconceptions 
(prolepsis), and feelings (pathos), all of which were needed to decide the nature of truth (See Diogenes 
Laertius, qtd. in ibid. p. 87.)  The notion of a ‘preconception’ here is perhaps the most fundamental 
kriterion for truth; the Epicureans thought they had gotten past the impasse of the epistemic problematic 
by admitting from the start that we all begin our inquiries with certain given categories (i.e. preconceived 
notions) which guide the inquiry along the way.  Otherwise, one would always be searching for the most 
determinative and bedrock foundation behind the starting point of an epistemic issue.   
The Stoics, following the lead of Epicurus on epistemological issues, were the philosophical 
school which Origen found most expedient for advancing his own epistemic views. They had a much 
more optimistic view concerning the possibility of obtaining true knowledge.  A paradigmatic example can 
be found in the philosopher Zeno, for whom sense-perception—which had been so thoroughly 
problematized by the Skeptics—emerged as a reliable basis for “scientific knowledge” (See Sedley and 
Long, p. 254.) The Stoics held that knowledge came about by virtue of a self-authenticating impression on 
one’s mind, via the process of “an object (to_ faino/menon) which, through the senses, produces an 
impression (fantasi/a) on the soul (Hauck, p. 241.) 
This comes about through the faculty of assent humans have in their cognitive makeup, what the 
Stoics called the phantasia kataleptike  (katalhptikh_n fantasi&an).  The phantasia is itself its own 
criterion of truth; there is no other ground of knowledge besides this self-evident epistemic principle.  
Accordingly, one cannot help but give one’s assent to propositions or the existence of physical realities 
when these impressions come to the mind so forcefully, bearing their own validation with them.  It would 
be misleading, however, to suggest that every impression was as self-evidently true as the phantasia 
kataleptike; indeed, there are many false impressions that can arise just as easily.  Many Stoics, for example, 
thought that the kinds of perceptions people had of dreams and prophetic phenomena should be treated 
rather skeptically (See Hauck, p. 242 ff.) 
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you.”106  Origen’s response indicates the extent to which he was familiar with the Stoic and 
Academic debates on epistemology.  He admits that it is indeed virtually impossible to 
establish “any story as historical fact” to such a high degree as “complete certainty”107  
Lacking this highest degree of epistemic certainty, one cannot possibly hope to even prove 
the occurrence of the Trojan War, for example.  The Trojan War itself undoubtedly took 
place, but the account of the war was interwoven with references to fantastic deities.  Deities 
are, of course, notorious for their reluctance to submit themselves to the test of empirical 
verifications.108  Must one, as the Skeptics and Stoics argued, withhold assent completely 
from such stories?  Is there no epistemic warrant at all for giving one’s assent? 
Origen was, of course, emphatically not a disciple of Pyrrho, or wholly a Stoic on 
epistemic issues. 109   His strategy for addressing the trustworthiness of sense perception is to 
subordinate it to a kind of moral epistemology, what he called the “divine sense.”  The 
“divine sense” is the sense impression of truth given only to men of virtue.110  This is the 
sense in which Origen is more of a Platonist than a Stoic epistemologically speaking—for 
the Platonists held that true knowledge, moving from the realm of becoming to the realm of 
being, was available only to the man of virtue.  In other words, men of virtue can see more 
clearly.  They can penetrate more effectively into the perception of truth.  This can be called 
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“moral epistemology” simply because it links knowing with being moral.  So, to answer 
Celsus’ question about who was trustworthy enough to verify a miracle of Jesus, Origen has 
to hold that the disciples and the gospel writers were trustworthy enough because they were 
men of virtue. 
  
iii.  Argument from Prophecy 
The proof from prophecy is periodically used to substantiate a myriad of potentially 
implausible events narrated in the Gospels.  Origen viewed this proof as a “very powerful” 
argument111, in fact, the “strongest argument confirming Jesus’ authority.”112  Origen’s 
reliance on the proof is in stark contrast to Celsus’ casual rejection of it.  Celsus reduced it to 
the level of a mere interpretative squabble between Christians and Jews.  His disdain is 
palpable when he describes the disagreement about the meaning of prophecy as nothing 
more than a “wrangle with one another about the shadow of an ass.”113  This pejorative 
comment was meant to suggest that there was an aura of triviality about the Jewish-Christian 
interpretative debates—but for Origen, of course, a great deal more was at stake. 
Origen does not stake his entire argument for miracles on his morally based 
epistemological convictions; he occasionally relies upon the proof from prophecy.114  
Naturally, this is brought in to argue for Jesus’ divine status, but it arises as a response to 
Celsus’ charge of sorcery against Jesus. “The miracles which he did” Origen comments, were 
“not by sorcery as Celsus thinks, but by a divine power foretold by the prophets.”115  The 
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miracle of the virgin birth is defended by Origen on similar grounds.  Celsus had attempted 
to debunk the virgin birth as a deceit constructed by Christians to cover up the fact that 
Jesus’ birth was the fruit of an adulterous liaison between Mary and a Roman soldier.116  
Origen rejects such aspersions out of hand, claiming instead that the virgin birth was part of 
a carefully scripted divine plan which had been clearly prophesied in the Old Testament.117 
 We have already seen some skepticism from Celsus about the Christian readings of 
Old Testament prophecy, but we have yet to flesh out the systematic meanings and purposes 
of the proof from prophecy.  The demonstration of this proof relied upon the unveiling of 
Christian meanings in a Jewish text, namely readings that purported to show that Jesus of 
Nazareth was the subject matter of a variety of different prophecies.  If these readings could 
be established as persuasive, then the Old Testament could be seen as an authoritative 
witness to central Christian claims.   
 As a persuasive technique, the proof from prophecy was apparently quite successful.  
It seems to have been an integral component in Justin Martyr’s conversion, and features 
prominently in his apologetic writings.118  The power of prophecy was certainly something 
that Origen believed in, and pointed to consistently in the Contra Celsum.  He had argued as 
early as Book I that  
A man coming to the gospel from Greek conceptions and training would not only 
judge that it [i.e. the truths of Christianity] was true, but would also put it into practice 
and so prove it to be correct; and he would complete what seemed to be lacking 
judged by the criterion of a Greek proof, thus establishing the truth of Christianity.  
Moreover, we have to say this, that the gospel has a proof which is peculiar to itself, 
and which is more divine than a Greek proof based on dialectical argument.  This 
more divine demonstration the apostle calls a ‘demonstration of the Spirit and of 
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power’…because of the prophecies and especially those which refer to Christ, which are capable of 
convincing anyone who reads them…119 
 
This is an extraordinary passage because it so succinctly summarizes Origen’s polemical 
presuppositions.  There is in Christianity, Origen believed, something that transcended the 
merely “dialectical” truths of Hellenistic philosophy.  Truth was not something that one 
merely progressed towards through analogy and abstract intellectual feats, but something 
that a thinker lived and embodied through a life of virtue.  The hypothetical person with this 
philosophical training might “judge” Christianity to be true by “putting it into practice’” but 
Christianity is not so narrow as to commend itself only to a person so carefully trained.  
Truth commends itself to “anyone” who approaches the central proof of Christianity, 
namely the prophecies of Christ found in the Old Testament. 
      Later in Book I, Origen describes the proof from prophecy as the “strongest 
argument confirming Jesus’ authority” insofar as it establishes that he “was prophesied by 
the prophets of the Jews, Moses and those after him and even before him.”120  Origen even 
claims that Celsus ignores the power of the prophecies because “he is unable to reply to the 
argument.”121  A strong statement to be sure, but why such confidence?  Is Celsus’ truly struck 
dumb by the clarity of the Christian reading of the Old Testament?  This does not seem 
likely; Celsus continually presses Origen in other passages about the plausibility of the 
Christian usage of Jewish material.  Origen even admits that some Jews had pressed him on 
these very readings, wondering where the Christians get the title “son of God” from the 
prophetic material.122  But the arguments went beyond semantics in many cases, for Origen 
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saw the combined authority of the prophetic materials as an overwhelming argument.  Why 
then, did the Jews resist seeing it? 
 Celsus observed that many have been perplexed by this question: “If the prophecies 
of Jesus possessed by the Jews were so clear, why then, when he came, did they not accept 
his teaching and change to the superior doctrines which Jesus had shown to them?”123  The 
answer, Origen speculated, was the result of a profound recalcitrance towards seeing the 
obvious nature of truth, brought about by the Jews’ stubborn attitudes.  It is hard to tear 
oneself from these fixed habits, Origen argued, harder still when those habits are of a 
religious kind.124  The image here is startling not only for its ominous foreshadowing of later 
developments in Christian anti-Judaism, but also for its stark polarization of Christians and 
Jews.  The picture of Christians is of a group of enlightened readers, open to reason, willing 
to listen to new ideas when they are backed up by proof.  Jews, on the other hand, are 
stubborn traditionalists, blind to the truth because of their resistance in seeing the truth of 
Christianity.  
 While the majority of the passages in which Origen discusses Judaism are restricted 
to Biblical Judaism, there are a few passages where he tells us that he has had multiple 
discussions with Jews about Biblical interpretation.  Before a long section on prophecy, 
Origen reminisces about a time when he had “a discussion with some Jews, who were 
alleged to be wise”125 about the reasons for believing in the historicity of Moses and Jesus.  
Concerning these two exemplars of Judaism and Christianity, Origen claims that “Both of 
them have the testimony of nations,” but outside of that, the Jews “have no proof about 
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Moses…indeed what is startling is that it is the evidence about Jesus in the law and the 
prophets which is used to prove that Moses and the prophets really were prophets of 
God.”126  No grounds for the historicity of Moses then, except for the witness provided 
retrospectively by the stories about Jesus.  It is odd that for most of his polemic, Origen has 
relied upon the antiquity of Judaism to “prove” Christianity.  Now the tables have turned: it 
is the Jews who need Christian witnesses to demonstrate the truth of their own religion.  
Celsus’ assertion that Christianity was not the fulfillment of Judaism was a 
continuous thorn in Origen’s side.  If Christianity is not the fulfillment of Judaism, then the 
prophecies of the Old Testament were all false.  Of course, one need not only attack the 
Christian readings of prophecies, one could look at the differences between the Christian 
New Testament and the Jewish Bible.  Celsus’ knowledge of the New Testament armed him 
with a powerful critique of the disparity between Jesus’ teachings and the teachings found in 
the Old Testament.  One of the clearest examples is worth quoting in full: 
“If the prophets of the God of the Jews foretold that Jesus would be his son, why 
did he give them laws by Moses that they were to become rich and powerful and to 
fill the earth and to massacre their enemies, children and all, and slaughter their 
entire race, which he himself did, so Moses says, before the eyes of the Jews?  And 
besides this, if they were not obedient, why does he expressly threaten to do to them 
what he did to their enemies?  Yet his son, the man of Nazareth, gives contradictory 
laws, saying that a man cannot come forward to the Father if he is rich or loves 
power or lays claim to any intelligence or reputation, and that he must not pay 
attention to food or to his storehouse any more than the ravens, or to clothing any 
more than the lilies, and that to a man who has struck him once he should offer 
himself to be struck once again.  Who is wrong?  Moses or Jesus?  Or when the father 
sent Jesus had he forgotten what commands he gave to Moses?  Or did he condemn 
his own laws and change his mind, and send his messenger for quite the opposite 
purpose?”127 
 
Celsus’ sees a fundamental disparity between the Christian claims of continuity with Judaism, 
and the altogether different realities of the Old Testament.  Whereas previous cultural 
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opponents of Christianity had not been generally familiar with the key texts of the Christian 
religion, Celsus brings to his polemic a much more sophisticated understanding of the basic 
claims of those texts.  In seizing upon this potential disparity, Celsus was attacking the very 
foundation of Christianity.   
 Origen’s response to this is not to suddenly proclaim the novelty of Christianity vis-
à-vis Biblical Judaism—that would have undermined his own position—but rather to argue 
that Celsus had fatally misinterpreted the Scriptures.  Celsus’ error was in thinking “that in 
the law and the prophets there is no deeper doctrine beyond that of the literal meaning of 
the words.”128  Origen’s understanding of the multivocality of Scripture, enforced by the 
Pauline notion of a dichotomy between the “letter that kills” and the “spirit gives life” is 
prominent in his rebuttal.129  Celsus was obviously reading the text on its most superficial 
level of meaning, exhibiting the danger of the “letter that kills” by taking the surface value of 
the text.  If one attends closely to the passages under consideration, one will see that the 
“literal interpretation is impossible.”130 
  When the Psalms writer says, for example, that “Every morning I killed all the 
sinners on earth, to destroy from the city of the Lord all the workers of iniquity”131, Origen 
suggests that it would have been impossible for such an event to take place, given the absurd 
logistics required in executing such massive carnage.  This is symptomatic of Origen’s larger 
strategy; he knows better than to defiantly affirm the literal meaning of the text because of 
the moral offense that would result from such readings, so he is pushed to find some deeper, 
in his terms, “spiritual” meaning to the text.  If Origen sees an argument leading to the 
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establishment of a possible disparity between Judaism and Christianity he averts disaster 
through his program of allegorical and non-literal interpretations.  Origen must stress 
continuity with Judaism, but he cannot stress it at the expense of having Christianity appear 
just like Judaism, or on an equal footing.  Non-literal readings are an argument for that 
continuity by virtue of establishing, for example, that Jesus did not promulgate laws that 
contradicted Moses’ dictums.  Celsus is well aware of the remarkable ambivalence displayed 
by Christians towards Jews: he notes that the Christians “originated from Judaism…they 
cannot name any other source for their teacher and chorus-leader.  Nevertheless they 
rebelled against the Jews.”132   
Despite Celsus’ separation of Christianity from Judaism, he has few kind words for 
the Jewish religion.  He echoes the anti-Judaic writers’ theme that the Jews had been of 
Egyptian extraction, hence copiers of another culture.  He sees both the Exodus event and 
the early Christian movement as dual examples of Jewish misanthropy insofar as the Jews’ 
actions had “led to the introduction of new ideas” by “revolting against the Egyptian 
community” and later the Romans.133  Furthermore, the Jews “never did anything of 
importance” and “were of no significance or prominence whatever.”134  Nonetheless, despite 
the Jews adherence to “worship which may be very peculiar…[it] is at least traditional.”135  
This strong traditionalism is the lynchpin of Celsus’ evaluation of religious truth.  Insofar as 
Celsus could separate Christians from Jews, he had automatically discredited them, since “it 
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is impious to abandon the customs which have existed in each locality from the 
beginning.”136 
If Celsus was foolish for reading too superficially in the Old Testament, then he was 
undoubtedly ignorant for ignoring the power of prophecies in those same texts.  The 
ambiguity of phrases in Isaiah 53 such as “Surely he has borne our infirmities and carried our 
diseases” could now be heard as unambiguous prophecy fulfilled in Jesus to the ears of 
Christians.  Where contemporary Christians saw Jesus as the obvious subject matter of this 
passage, the Jews saw a figurative device for talking about Israel as a nation.  Origen is 
amazed at the Jews’ wayward readings that precluded seeing prophecies about Jesus in the 
text.  “Who is this if not Jesus Christ?”  Origen wonders.  For Origen, the Jews’ resistance to 
this reading is symptomatic of a more general stubbornness to ascend from the bodily, literal 
level of the text, to the ethereal heights of spiritual readings.137 
Origen would have to face a more effective critique than this.  The apostles and the 
earliest Christians were Jewish, and yet by Celsus’ time, most Christians were not Jewish.  
Celsus wonders if wayward Christians of the 2nd century had “left the law of their 
fathers…and…deserted to another name and another life”?138  Origen was well aware of the 
potential problem this might cause, and he is eager to avoid the charge of novelty that would 
wrest Christianity from its antique Jewish moorings.  Jesus had hinted at such an abrogation, 
but he knew his followers were not ready.  This is why he enigmatically promised them “I 
have still many things to say to you,”139 where “many things” signifies the purging of the 
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overly literal reading of Torah by the cleansing fire of the spiritual interpretation.  This 
“literal” reading resulted in the Jews’ adherence to their many festival and dietary 
observances.  Were not the early Jewish followers of Jesus too attached to their traditional 
understanding of Judaism?  Origen describes the Jews as habituated to this surface reading, 
which in turn generated surface observances—but the time was coming when that would all 
be transcended. 
Habits can, after a long duration, become something like a fixed nature.140  Had the 
Jewish habits of observing the literal level of Torah become something like a second skin, a 
skin that is at one with the “bodily” or somatic reading of Scripture?  Origen’s account 
purports to explain the Jewish readings as a habituated stubbornness, one that cannot 
penetrate into the readings of the Old Testament like the Christians.  They can only “read 
them superficially and only as stories.”141  But while the Jewish apostles of Jesus could be 
forgiven for their observance of the “literal” law, later generations—on Origen’s reading—
would be shown less mercy.  Since the Jews “did not comprehend the divinity within him 
[i.e. Jesus],” they would be “entirely forsaken and possess nothing of those things which 
from antiquity they have regarded as sacred, and have not even any vestige of divine power 
among them.”142   
Why is there no longer any remnant of God’s providential guiding of the Jews?  
“Because they were very ignoble people” we are told, “and although they committed many 
sins they did not suffer for them any comparable calamities to those caused by what they had 
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dared to do to our Jesus.”143  Deicide accounts for the destruction of the Temple in 70 CE, the 
scattering of Jews into the Diaspora, and their persecution under foreign rulers.  Despite 
these clear examples of anti-Judaism, it would be inaccurate to call Origen anti-Semitic.144  
After all, Origen had learned Hebrew and continuously interacted with living Jews in a 
friendly intellectual environment.   
All of these arguments and themes in the Contra Celsum were brought about because 
Celsus realized that the problem with the Christian usage of the proof from prophecy was 
that many Jews did not agree with the readings of Scripture that the Christians claimed 
supported the proof.  Celsus found the readings forced as well.  Origen’s response is to 
appeal to the Christian’s deeper, more spiritual readings of the Old Testament.  If these 
deeper readings were adhered to faithfully, then they could reveal the true prophetic 
meanings of many Old Testament passages.  Even though Origen claimed to have placed 
great weight on the proof from prophecy, it is simply not featured as prominently and as 
frequently as the antiquity and moral effect arguments are.   
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There is a certain artificiality in selecting and then naming three “arguments” in  
Origen’s Contra Celsum.  He certainly did not begin his polemic by spelling out precisely 
which arguments would be deployed, and in what fashion.  One of the tasks of modern 
exegetes is to tease out the strains of argumentative discourse that one can find in a text like 
the Contra Celsum.  We seek to make order out of disorder, to name what has previously gone 
unnamed.  We have analyzed and detailed the argument from antiquity, the moral effect 
argument, and the proof from prophecy.  What remains is a brief evaluation of the 
persuasiveness of these arguments and an assessment of the work as a whole. 
 All three arguments had a rich history even before Origen decided to use them in his 
polemic, and they would have an even richer future after Origen died.  Of the three, the 
argument from antiquity seems the weakest.  To base one’s view of truth on the perceived 
antiquity of the culture from which one gathers certain ideas makes a dubious assumption, 
namely that the older one’s cultural heritage is, the more sound one’s grasp of truth is.  But 
why should we assume this?  Why should we assume that just because a given culture is 
older that it has a more secure grip on “truth” than we do?  The apologists never answer 
this.  It may very well turn out that this view is warranted in certain contexts, but it should 
never be taken as an a priori. 
 The moral effect argument is important and widely used today.  At its simplest 
exposition, it posits that one should believe in a given religion because the practitioners of 
that religion are morally superior to the practitioners of other religions.  One would like to 
know if there were a way of adjudicating between the rival moral claims of a given tradition, 
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such that this argument could lay claim to a kind of objectivity.  To say that one is morally 
superior is to open up a variety of other questions, such as the exact nature of what is moral 
and so on.  That is just another way of saying that this argument is not open and shut, it 
relies upon the exposition of other points in other related arguments.   
 The proof from prophecy, at least as Origen construed it, only became a proof once 
one had entered into the deeper, more spiritual realm of Christian hermeneutics.  That is to 
say, one could only see the Christian readings of the prophecies once one had embraced 
Christian ways of reading the Old Testament.  No wonder then that Celsus was so perplexed 
by the proof: he simply saw no reason in entertaining such readings.  Outsiders like Justin 
Martyr and many others were, of course, persuaded by the proof from prophecy to convert 
to Christianity.  For someone like Celsus, who already had a low opinion of Judaism, the 
proof from prophecy must have sounded like so much Christian mythmaking.     
 The Contra Celsum as a whole is a vast, rambling discursus on a whole set of 
fascinating, yet tangential topics.  Its tangential nature is perhaps its key impediment to real 
coherence.  Origen was undoubtedly a polymath for his time, as witnessed by the ease with 
which he tackled a diverse and challenging set of topics.  Many of these topics strayed 
outside of Christian life and literature.  Despite the polymathic nature of the Contra Celsum, it 
lacks the focus and power of Origen’s other works—the Peri Archon especially.  It is more 
like a rambling and occasional encyclopedic survey of Christian argumentation than it is a 
concentrated exposition on a specific topic.  However, this weakness is at once its greatest 
strength.  The lack of editing, the rambling discursive nature of the text, and its cyclical, 
often repetitive themes all give it a kind of freshness that make for a fascinating 
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anthropological read.  The Contra Celsum’s unwieldy nature is perhaps the main reason why it 
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